Optimists, by contrast, have argued that conventional models systematically underestimate the long-run impact of exchange rate shifts. Because conventional estimation techniques operate with extremely long lags, they allegedly cannot pick up the effects of exchange rate shifts. Proponents of this view have bolstered their case with studies that compare absolute costs of production internationally. The broadest of the studies, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations, suggests that by 1987 the dollar had become much too weak.3 Studies that focus more narrowly on manufacturing costs indicate that unit costs in the United States have been considerably lower than those in other industrial countries.4 Other grounds for optimism have been improved U.S. productivity growth in manufacturing in the 1980s and increased foreign investment in U.S. manufacturing, which has raised the possibilities for import substitution.
1990
. Does this recent behavior refute those pessimists who have been arguing that major declines in the dollar or other structural changes should have been required for the trade balance to fall? Does it support the optimists who suggest that conventional model builders have seriously underestimated the long-run boost current exchange rates would provide? Is the current account likely to continue its decline, even without further depreciation of the dollar?7
In this paper, I address these questions and present evidence supporting a view of the trade adjustment process similarto the one described by conventional modelers. In order to evaluate recent trade performance more clearly, I first adjust the data for measurement problems associated with computer prices. With the cleaner data, I use equations that are estimated over the pre-1985 period to track U.S. trade performance in the second half of the 1980s. My results indicate that hysteresis and other structural factors have not inhibited the adjustment process. Trade prices have responded symmetrically to both the dollar's appreciation and its depreciation. In addition, trade volumes have responded predictably to relative prices and economic activity. In the second half of the 1980s, the U.S. economy grew sufficiently slowly, relative to its trading partners, to offset long-run growth in the trade deficit that might have resulted from differences in activity elasticities. If the growth differential of the past three years continues and relative prices remain constant, the U.S. balance of trade in goods and services (excluding oil imports and agricultural exports) should change very little.
In the last part of the paper I look at two other issues that are often raised in discussions about the U.S. balance of payments. First, there is no evidence to support the claim that U.S.-Japanese trade has been particularly unresponsive to the price of the dollar. Second, some evidence indicates that the real burden of the rise in U.S. international indebtedness has been lower than expected. The behavior of petroleum imports and agricultural exports is sufficiently idiosyncratic as to warrant separate treatment. Accordingly, this paper will concentrate on the trade balance in goods and services excluding oil imports and agricultural exports (the nonoil and nonagricultural, or NONA, balance). The exclusions do not alter the size of the deficit changes. Between 1987 and the first half of 1990, the respective declines in the trade deficit are similar whether oil imports and agricultural exports are included or not.
Measurement of Computer Prices
One other complicating feature of the data is the peculiar treatment of computer prices in the trade accounts.9 Table 3 shows the effect of including and excluding computers when changes in the principal trade aggregates-nonagricultural exports and nonoil imports-are broken Sources: Values and implicit price deflators are BEA data taken from DRI and OECD data bases. Quantities are calculated from value and price indexes. Percent changes are calculated from the differences in logarithms in each category from the beginning to the end of each period. down into changes in prices and quantities.'0 Interestingly, over the decade the rise in the value of imports exceeds the value of exports by around 20 percent, whether or not computers are included."I One must look more closely, at the price and volume changes, in order to see the impact of computers. While export and import prices, as measured by their deflators in the GNP accounts, increased by 12.0 and 10.3 percent respectively, the volume of imports rose 22.0 percentage points more than the volume of exports. These findings suggest the presence of some measurement problem. In particular, these data indicate that import and export prices rose much less than the U.S. producer price index for all finished goods, which rose 33.6 percent over this period. The suspicions are confirmed when computers are excluded from the data, as in the last column of table 3. The results show that export and import deflators rise 10. Expressing the deficit as a ratio (C) of nonagricultural exports to nonoil imports allows a logarithmic decomposition of changes into price and quantity components, if C = V,/V,,, then ln C = ln V, -ln V,, = In Q., + In P, -In Q,,l -In P,,;
and, Aln C = Aln Q, + Aln P., -Aln Q,, -Aln P,,,. 11. In 1980, when the ratio between nonagricultural exports and nonoil imports was 1. 1, the NONA balance was a surplus of $21.6 billion. By the first half of 1990, the ratio was 0.87 and the NONA deficit stood at $49.3 billion. much faster when computers are excluded, while the growth in export and import volumes is correspondingly reduced.
Computers have such a large impact because the nominal values of computer exports and computer imports have grown rapidly while the relative price of computers has declined drastically. This unusual behavior can be explained by the dramatic technical change experienced by the computer industry; this phenomenon contributes to the measurement problems seen in the trade data. To estimate the volumes of the computer trade, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has constructed ahedonic price index for computers, and uses this one index to deflate the value of computer exports, computer imports, and producers durable equipment. This treatment of computers by the BEA makes it difficult to interpret U.S. trade data. As shown in table 4, the BEA index, which uses 1982 as its base year, had fallen to 29 by 1990. This decline in the deflator has produced an explosive increase in the estimated volume of computer exports and imports. As a result, the overall deflators for exports and imports of goods and services have risen more slowly. Furthermore, because exports and imports of computers have both risen, the effect on the trade balance is less dramatic. Over the decade, a $2.1 billion worsening in the nominal trade balance becomes a $4.6 billion improvement when measured in 1982 prices.
The effect of computers on broader price indexes poses problems for most models that try to explain trade performance by estimating trade volumes and prices separately. It is no wonder that, as Ellen Meade has shown, models in which computers are disaggregated outperform those in which they are not.12 It is also not surprising that analysts who have tried to explain trade price behavior using the official deflators have found peculiarities after 1985. The failure of the equations to predict prices accurately has presented major forecasting problems.'3 As it happens, some models based on these deflators had price elasticities close to one, and so were relatively accurate in forecasting trade values, since price and quantity errors offset one another. 14 Daniel Citrin as well as Peter Hooper and Catherine Mann shows that when fixed-weight price indexes, which include the hedonic measures of computer prices, are used in place of implicit deflators, most econo-12. Meade (forthcoming). 13. See the discussion of the Hooper-Helkie model in Cline (1989) . 14. Bryant (1988) . Although better than implicit deflators, the BEA's fixed-weight price indexes are not entirely satisfactory for use in trade estimation. First, these fixed-weight price indexes use the same hedonic price series for export and import prices of computers. Even if we accept that the hedonic price measure is appropriate for computers used in the United States, it may not be appropriate for either exports or imports because the mix of products traded internationally is different. Recognizing this, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has constructed price indexes for computer exports and imports that are based on conventional matchedmodel techniques. The BLS measures indicate a major divergence between export and import prices. Between 1982 and 1990, the nonhedonic BLS computer export pricesfell by 13 percent, while nonhedonic computer import prices rose by 10 percent (see table 4). 16 Second, even with appropriate price measures, when product mixes shift fixed-weight price measures cannot fully explain the behavior of trade volumes, nor can they be used to deflate trade values.'7 Implicit deflators (or ideally chaini-weighted deflators) would measure volume changes better. But when deflators are used as independent variables in a regression that explains trade volumes, they can bias the coefficients because any error in price measurement will create an offsetting error in volume measurement.
Although there is no clear solution to these problems, I address them by omitting computers from my regression analysis. I also generate my own price indexes for various import and export categories and for a broad measure of domestic prices with which to compare them. The end-use price series are formed by splicing the BLS end-use price series, which are available after mid-1983, with the BEA fixed-weight price indexes. The end-use price series and the fixed-weight deflators for exports and imports of services are aggregated using three-year moving Table 5 indicates that when computers are excluded from the price calculations, the constructed export and import price series grow by 30 and 31 percent over the decade respectively. This is in contrast to the deflators for nonagricultural exports and nonoil imports, which increase only 13 and 11 percent. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, U.S. exporters had restored both their profit margins and their relative price competitiveness. The 30 percent rise in U.S. export prices matches the growth in the U.S. domestic price level (up 31 percent), the producer price index for finished goods excluding food (up 33 percent), and the OECD's manufactured export price index of U.S. competitors (up 30 percent). The rise in U.S. import prices matches the rise in domestic prices, foreign unit labor costs, and foreign export prices measured in dollars. Thus, by the late 1980s, foreigners who had been competing in the U.S. market had lost a relative price advantage that had been associated with the strong dollar. As a result, the relative profitability of exporting to the a. Relative import price figures, excluding oil and computer trade, are the ratio of the author's own import and domestic price indexes. A second-order Almon lag of relative import prices was specified over five periods with no restrictions. Equation 8. 1, fitted over the entire sample period, indicates that over the long run, when actual and potential output grow at the same rate, each 1 percent increase in output will be associated with a 2.5 percent increase in the volume of NONC imports, the sum of the coefficients on actual and potential output. For each percentage point deviation from this path, imports will deviate by 1.8 percent in the same direction. The price effects, for their part, generate a J curve in the short run. In the first year, a 1 percent increase in relative import prices will reduce volumes by only 0.8 percent. After eighteen months, however, the volume reductions will outweigh the price increases. Over the long run (two and a half years), import volumes will decline by 1.5 percent. The equation tracks import volumes within sample with a standard error of just 2.1 percent. However, there is serial autocorrelation in the error term.
In equation 8.2, fitted over the subsample 1976-84, the estimates of the cyclical effects are somewhat larger. Each 1 percent deviation of real GNP from its potential is associated with a 2.4 percent deviation of imports in the same direction. However, the estimate of the long-run impact of growth is virtually unchanged. When actual and potential output grow at the same rate, each 1 percent increase in output is associated with a 2.6 percent increase in import volumes. The estimate of the price elasticity over the long run is slightly lower than it was for the full sample equation. But the equation puts more of the price effects in the first and second periods.
When equation 8.2 is used to forecast out of sample, it has a mean absolute error of 3.1 percent from 1985 to the first half of 1990. The equation tracks imports accurately through the second half of 1988, when the overprediction is just 2.6 percent. In 1989 and the first half of 1990, however, the equation overpredicts import volumes by an average of 6.5 percent. The negative errors, or overpredictions, certainly contradict the pessimists who have claimed hysteresis would reduce the responsiveness of import volumes to relative price changes. To some extent, the results support the optimists who believe that the U.S. import growth coefficients might be slowing.
The last two equations in table 8 report an alternative specification in which the volume of real domestic demand-the sum of real consumption, real investment, and real government expenditures-is used as the short-run activity variable. This specification yields lower estimates for the price elasticities but similar long-run income elasticities. It indicates even more strongly that import volumes have been unexpectedly low since the second half of 1988.
IMPORTS:
A NOMINAL SPECIFICATION.
Thus far I have presented equations both for an import price index that does not correspond to the import price deflator and for an import quantity that has been estimated using the official nonoil, noncomputer import deflator. Although instructive, the product of the price and quantity forecasts from these equations does not equal the nominal value of imports. To obtain a complete system capable of forecasting nominal trade values from these equations would require forecasting the implicit deflator. As an alternative, a. Relative import price figures, excluding oil and computer trade, are the ratio of the author's own import and domestic price indexes. A second-order Almon lag of relative import prices was specified over five periods with no restrictions. export prices as measured by the OECD. The price coefficient is estimated using a third-order Almon-lag specification over six periods. Again, estimates are reported for the span 1976-90, and for 1976-84. This specification performed better than, but similarly to, ones that use a gap measure for the rest of the world or some measure of U.S. export market growth.
Equation 10.1 in table 10 tracks NANC export volumes with a standard error of 2.1 percent. Each 1 percent increase in foreign demand raises U.S. NANC exports by 1.6 percent. The long-run price elasticity on U.S. exports is 1.1, with the effects spread out fairly evenly over the full three-year period. Estimates using lags longer than three years, which are not reported in the table, do not add to the equation's explanatory power.
The coefficients remain fairly stable when the specification is estimated without correction for first-order serial autocorrelation (equation 10.2), and over the subsample period 1976-84 (equation 10.3). When estimated over the subsample, the equation tracks exports out of sample with considerable accuracy. The mean absolute error of the elevenperiod forecast is 2.7 percent, which compares quite favorably with the in-sample standard error of 1.9 percent. The larger errors in the out-ofsample forecast occur between the first halves of 1986 and 1987, when U. S. export volumes were higher than predicted. Thereafter the equation tracks NANC volumes well; in the first half of 1990, it indicates that they were just 1.3 percent higher than might have been expected. Taken together with the price forecast from equation 7.3, which indicates export prices were just 0.3 percent higher than expected, this system has no trouble explaining export behavior.
Interpretation of Empirical Results
The coefficients on the GNP terms in import equations like these could be interpreted as pure income elasticities under the assumption of both imperfect substitution and infinite supply elasticities of importable goods both at home and abroad. But, as has long been recognized, it is likely that, given their relatively crude formulation, these "activity" effects capture not only pure income effects, but also the impact of supply-side effects and nonprice influences. Nonprice influences, such as product quality, variety, and innovation, affect trade flows in a fairly a. Relative export prices are defined as the ratio of the author's own nonagricultural, noncomputer export price index and the foreign export price index for all other OECD countries. A third-order Almon lag of relative export prices was specified over six periods with no restrictions. steady fashion; they are, therefore, difficult to separate out from pure income effects.24 Because these equations fail to provide an adequate structural description of import determination, they are not well suited for projecting the effects of growth. Efforts must be made to capture supply-side effects more explicitly and successfully than the equations do.25 Accordingly, the equations should be viewed as statistical summaries of the relationship between endogenous variables, rather than as strict structural models of income effects.26 Nonetheless, the differences in elasticity do help detect the role of long-run declines in U.S. competitiveness, and help forecast under the assumption that the relationships between these variables continue to hold.27
Consider The results of such a decomposition are given in table 11, which reports changes in the NONANC coverage ratio over the 1980s. During this period, the equation system accurately tracks U.S. trade performance, and confirms that price effects have no impact on the coverage ratio over this period. The terms of trade effects are relatively small and positive for the decade as a whole (2.0 percent), and are partially offset by a small residual of -0.6 percent. The dominant impact, therefore, comes from the activity effects. These account for almost the entire 21.5 percent logarithmic decline in the coverage ratio.
The decomposition exercise also offers some interesting insights into the fluctuations in the coverage ratio over the decade. Between 1980 and 1985, the large decline in the coverage ratio reflects the effect of faster growth in the United States and the impact of the strong dollar, which was partially offset by improvements in the U.S. terms of trade. Typically, as the price equations indicate, with a dollar appreciation import prices, expressed in dollars, tend to fall and export prices to rise. In the second half of the decade, relatively slower growth in the United States has offset most of the differential in activity elasticities, so that What has been overlooked in this debate, however, is the fact that bilateral trade balances will be affected by both the level of the initial imbalance and the subsequent rate of adjustment. For example, in 1987 U.S. exports to Japan totaled $28.2 billion and were one-third the size of U.S. imports from Japan; thus, U.S. exports to Japan would have had to grow three times as fast as imports from Japan, simply for the balance to remain unchanged. By contrast, in the same year U.S. exports to Europe equaled $60.5 billion, or 74.5 percent of total U.S. imports from Europe. For the trade balance with Europe to remain unchanged, exports to Europe would have had to rise only 1.3 times as rapidly as imports. A large initial ratio of imports to exports, therefore, entails a slower adjustment in the deficit measure. Since 1987, changes in the bilateral deficit with Japan actually say more about the initial ratio of exports to imports than any subsequent adjustment.
Indeed, as table 12 reports, between 1987 and the first half of 1990, the dollar value of U.S. exports to Japan grew more rapidly than U.S. exports in general, and as rapidly as U.S. exports to Europe. Over the same period, U.S. imports from Japan grew less rapidly than U.S. imports in general, and U.S. imports from Europe in particular. Similarly, between 1987 and 1990 Japan accounted for a growing share of U.S. manufactured goods exports and a declining share of U.S. manufactured goods imports. In short, both export and import performance indicate that Japan has adjusted more than Europe and other trading partners of the United States.
At the margin, Japanese imports respond to relative import price changes almost as sensitively as other countries.32 In addition, Japan shows signs of a structural shift toward higher import income elasticities.33 While this evidence does not necessarily imply the absence of unusual trade barriers, it does suggest that, if present, they operate like tariffs, which do not stifle marginal responses to exchange rate changes, rather than like quotas.
Finally, the use of Japan's share of the overall U.S. trade deficit as a measure of how much Japan has adjusted is highly misleading. Note that in 1980, when the United States had an overall trade deficit of $19.5 billion, Japan accounted for 51.7 percent of the deficit. This feature of the trade balance results from a structural component of the bilateral deficit with Japan. Even if both Japan and the United States had balanced trade, Japan would probably still run a surplus with the United States in order to offset its deficit with OPEC. Paradoxically, the rising Japanese share in the overall U.S. deficit actually points to a return to these structural levels rather than a lack of adjustment to the dollar's depreciation. In 1987, the ratio of income to equity for U.S. manufacturing was 12.8 percent while the return to foreign direct investment in manufacturing, valued at historic cost, was just 5.9 percent. Measures of income to sales confirm the picture. Between 1983 and 1987, the income-sales ratio on foreign investment in U.S. manufacturing was 1.2 percent, less than half the average income-sales ratios for U.S. domestic manufacturers (4.2 percent) and U.S. direct investment abroad (3.6 percent).
The Burden of the
One interpretation of these data is that American managers care more about profits than foreign managers. This conclusion could, in turn, indicate that American-owned firms face a higher cost of capital, although this explanation contradicts the fact that foreign-owned firms in the United States tend to finance their operations locally. A second interpretation is that foreign investment in the United States is a relatively new phenomenon and will take time to become more profitable. However, this interpretation may not be fully credible because returns on foreign investment in the United States have been low for a long time now. Finally, there is the possibility that the data are erroneous, possibly because foreigners deliberately underreport their earnings in the United States for tax or other purposes.
For some foreign investors, particularly foreign governments, the incentive to underreport income is presumably high. Why pay tax to the United States if you can avoid it? The underreporting is most likely achieved by overstating the costs of imported components-a practice known as transfer pricing. Transfer pricing should not affect the overall U.S. current account but can lead to an overstatement of import values and an understatement of payments on DFI. However, if tax evasion is the reason that companies engage in transfer pricing, it is surprising that the practice would have persisted despite the reduction in U. S. corporate tax rates in 1986. Companies from countries that do not tax their multinationals on a global basis should have an incentive to report income in the United States rather than at home. Nevertheless, whatever the reason, the decline in the U.S. current account has not been as large as might have been expected. Table 14 indicates that, with the exception of the finance and insurance industries, the low returns are pervasive. The table also shows especially low returns for investors from Germany, France, Japan, Latin America, and the Middle East, and higher returns for investors from Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada.
Inflation
Just as gross domestic product (GDP) ignores depreciation on domestically held assets, so may it be appropriate forgross national product (GNP) to ignore depreciation on foreign-held assets. Nevertheless, it is certainly appropriate, when using other measures of national product, to account properly for changes in the real value of U.S. net debt. Indeed, erosion in the real value of U.S. net debt means that the increase in the real debt-servicing burden has been much less than reported by the net-factor income measure. The official data fail to differentiate between interest payments on debt, which represent genuine servicing payments, and those that actually compensate owners for the inflationary past eighteen months, there is evidence that U.S. imports are growing more slowly than expected.
In summary, there is modest support for those who believe direct foreign investment and other factors may have reduced the U.S. propensity to import, but there is little support for the pessimists who have claimed that U.S. trade flows would not respond to exchange rate changes. In particular, conventional wisdom about Japanese trade adjustment is incorrect. Judged, as it should be, by the growth rates of Japanese imports and exports, U.S .-Japanese trade has actually adjusted more rapidly than either total U.S. trade or trade with Europe alone.
The behavior of net factor income in the United States does contain surprises. The apparent average rate of return to direct foreign investment in the United States has been very low, keeping net factor income from changing much despite a decade of large current account deficits. If one corrects the value of the U.S. net debt for inflation, the additional international debt, measured in real terms, assumed by the United States over the 1980s has resulted in a surprisingly small increase in real U.S. international debt-service burdens.
Comments and Discussion
Peter Hooper: Robert Lawrence's paper makes four basic points. First, conventional empirical modeling of U.S. trade flows has been complicated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis's hedonic price index for computers. Second, the behavior of U.S. trade and current account balances through the first half of 1990 can be reasonably well explained by the conventional models, whether or not they make special adjustments for computers. One doesn't need to resort to unfair trade practices or hysteresis to explain the continuing U.S. external deficit.
Third, the widening of the U.S. external deficit over the past decade presents a bit of a mystery, since U.S. GNP has grown no more than foreign GNP over that period and the dollar's real exchange rate is now almost back to its 1980 level. Lawrence's explanation is based on the familiar Houthakker-Magee result-that the trade deficit widens because the income elasticity of imports is substantially greater than that of exports.
Fourth, even given a widening deficit, there is no need for concern because the large cumulative external deficits run over the past decade have resulted in almost no increase in the real U.S. international debt service burden.
While I enjoyed the paper, I also found ample room for disagreement with several of the points that were made. I will begin with the discussion of computers. As Lawrence points out, BEA's treatment of computer prices, as measured by the hedonic index, is potentially misleading because it assumes that the prices of imports, exports, and domestic shipments of computers are all one and the same. BLS data suggest, to the contrary, that movements in the prices of computer imports and exports have diverged from one another. Lawrence concludes that the 383 BLS data are preferable. However, those data may significantly overstate increases in the prices of both imports and exports of computers because they do not factor in the tremendous technological advances that have taken place over the past decade. They still price by the box, if you will, rather than by the power or the capability of the box.
Using BLS data, Lawrence constructs a set of new aggregate price indexes for imports and exports. The series that he constructs are neither fixed-weight indexes nor deflators (which use moving-quantity weights). Instead he uses moving-value weights, which, in principle, could impart an inflationary bias to those indexes. With moving-value weights, trade categories in which prices rise faster than average will tend to get an increasing weight over time, other things being equal, while those categories in which prices are rising slower than average will be given decreasing weight.
Lawrence is careful not to use his indexes to deflate trade values for use in his import and export quantity equations; to do so would be inappropriate. But then one wonders why he constructed his price indexes in the first place; why not just use the BLS fixed-weight index, or at least construct a deflator using volume weights? I fully agree with Lawrence that the exclusion of computers makes it easier to explain the movements in BEA's measures of the prices and volumes of imports and exports in recent years. This adjustment is helpful for the type of historical accounting exercise that he pursues in the paper. However, this adjustment does not help much when models are put to the more stringent test of policy simulation and forecastingthat is, when trade in computers can no longer be treated exogenously. In modeling work at the Federal Reserve, we have found that because of difficulties encountered in estimating equations for trade in computers, one can do just as well predicting total trade flows with aggregate equations as with disaggregated equations.
A final point on computers. I was struck that the rather lengthy treatment of this issue in the paper stands alone; the implications of computer prices for trade modeling do not seem to have much bearing on the more central issue of external adjustment raised elsewhere in the paper. Lawrence points out elsewhere in the paper that conventional models that do not adjust for computers (in particular those surveyed by Ralph Bryant) appear to have done reasonably well in predicting the trade balance. I might note that several other models that do adjust for computers, including the one we have been working with at the Federal Reserve, have been overpredicting the trade deficit by a considerable margin recently, particularly by overpredicting imports. Indeed, Lawrence's own equations that exclude computers overpredicted imports by an increasingly significant margin during 1989-90.
Next, let me turn to the mystery surrounding the widening of the external deficit over the 1980s and Lawrence's explanation for it based on the Houthakker-Magee result. The mystery emerges only in the process of accounting with partial-equilibrium trade models. That accounting asks why the external deficit should be any greater now than in 1980, since its key determinants-relative income and relative pricesare back to where they were in 1980.
From the more fundamental perspective of exogenous shifts in domestic saving and investment, the persistence of an external deficit should come as no surprise. The U.S. structural or full employment budget deficit is now much greater than it was in 1980, and the personal saving rate remains well below its level of ten years ago. In fact, one might wonder why the external deficit continued to narrow as rapidly as it did through the first half of this year.
In a general-equilibrium framework, of course, exogenous shifts in saving and investment are transmitted to trade flows through changes in income (or domestic demand) and relative prices. So the picture we get from trade equations should be consistent. I will argue that it is. U.S. GNP may have grown about the same as foreign GNP over the past decade, but U.S. domestic demand, or C + I + G, has risen about 4 percentage points more than that abroad. If domestic demand were the key activity variable in trade equations, the difference in demand alone could explain most of the net widening of the deficit. In addition, while the dollar's real exchange rate may have returned to its 1980 level (at least by some measures), the relative prices of imports and exports that enter into trade equations have not. In the Federal Reserve's model, the price of imports relative to domestic U.S. prices has fallen somewhat more over the past ten years than the price of exports relative to domestic prices abroad. Thus, imports have been stimulated more than exports by movements in relative prices.
But let us suppose that GNP is the relevant activity variable, and that most of the net increase in the trade deficit is left unexplained by movements in relative prices. The Houthakker-Magee result is only one of several plausible explanations for the observation that U.S. imports tend to grow faster than U.S. exports, other things being equal. In a paper presented to this panel several years ago, Paul Krugman and Richard Baldwin argued that after accounting for the influences of income and relative prices, the U.S. trade balance tended to show a secular decline. ' They attributed this decline and an associated secular decline in the dollar's real exchange rate to the lagging productivity growth and the diminishing technological edge of the United States relative to its trading partners.
Some of my colleagues and I have, for some time, been working under the assumption that the Houthakker-Magee result really reflects longerterm supply-side developments. These developments are inadequately represented in movements in relative price variables but at the same time are strongly correlated with longer-term trends in GNP. We have found that adding supply proxies to the equations significantly reduces the difference in estimated income elasticities.
Just how one views this empirical issue can affect one's view of the future prospects of the external deficit. For example, a slowing of U.S . growth relative to growth abroad could have a strong effect on the trade deficit if the income elasticity of the demand for imports is as high as Lawrence estimates. However, if part of that high elasticity actually reflects the effects of trends in foreign supply, the effect of lower domestic growth would be smaller. Lawrence, who cites Ellen Meade's work as important, observes that the significance of relative supply variables in trade equations falls when computers are taken out. However, they do remain at least marginally significant in Meade's import equation and they are quite significant when computers are removed.
Several years ago, I argued that the sharp decline in the dollar could stimulate ongoing supply-side shifts that would begin to reverse the secular downtrend in the U.S. external balance. As Lawrence notes, there is some evidence in the recent improvement in the trade balance to support this view. However, the supply-side view also predicted that we would begin to see a shift in manufacturing output capacity toward the United States. This part of the prediction does not appear to have been realized; the effects of the decline in the dollar have been dominated by other factors that have led to an investment boom abroad and not at home.
The paper concludes on an optimistic note about the effect of the large cumulative U.S. external deficits over the past decade on the U.S. real debt burden. The decline in U.S. real net foreign investment income caused by the increase in U.S. net debt to foreigners has been relatively small. According to the estimates presented, U. S. real net foreign income adjusted for inflation fell from over 1 percent of GNP in 1980 to about 0.25 percent of GNP in 1989. Some would argue that a decline equal to 0.75 percent of GNP is not trivial. Moreover, these estimates probably understate the potential future costs of the debt that has already been accumulated. As Lawrence points out, U.S. residents have benefited from a substantially greater rate of return on their direct investment assets abroad than what they pay on foreign-held direct investment in the United States. The rate of payment on foreign direct investment in the United States has been unusually low and has declined further recently, for any number of reasons. But at least some of those reasons, including the cyclical decline in U.S. domestic growth and corporate profits over the past year and a half, are likely to be reversed in the future. When rates of return eventually begin to rise toward more normal levels, the real burden of the external debt incurred by the United States over the past decade will increase as well.
General Discussion
Robert Barro questioned the author's basic approach. He argued that it is inappropriate to estimate equations for imports and exports without taking into account the fact that current account balances are the difference between a country's production and expenditures, or, equivalently, the difference between domestic saving and investment. These flows are connected by an intertemporal budget constraint that also involves the initial stock of net foreign claims. Hence, he believed that the current account deficit can be traced back to the incentives for saving and investment. Martin Baily responded that although the federal deficit has had a major influence on the trade deficit, it presumably works by affecting national income, the exchange rate, and relative prices. Therefore, apart from possible estimation difficulties arising from endogeneity, he found nothing wrong with focusing on how those variables affected imports and exports without estimating the whole model. He did suggest, however, that the estimates might be affected if the domestic component of demand were used in place of GNP.
The reported low rate of return earned on direct foreign investment provoked discussion among the panelists. William Brainard urged caution in interpreting the estimates. He found it unlikely that foreigners systematically selected worse investments than the typical American investor, indeed so much worse that their return has been lower than the return on government securities. Baily suggested that the low returns could be the result of transfer pricing policies designed by foreign investors to generate profits at home. He noted that if imported factors of production are being systematically overpriced then imports are being overstated. William Cline added that the plausible alternative assumptions about rates of return have a major effect on projections of the current account deficit a few years out. Cline and Robert Gordon both expressed misgivings about the Houthakker-McGee effect, especially in light of recent work by Paul Krugman that suggests that it is impossible to disentangle income elasticities from time trends.
Gordon noted that using the BEA deflator for computer prices doubles the current weight attributed to computers in GNP relative to the base year of 1982. Further, use of the BEA deflator gives them virtually zero weight before 1975. He did not agree, however, that it is correct to use the BLS deflator instead, since it does not correct for changes in performance. He recommended use of chain-weight or fixed-weight deflators. Also, he noted that the problems with the BLS measure are not limited to computers because the BLS makes inadequate quality adjustments for many components. Gordon pointed out that other countries do not use similar computer deflators; the much greater growth rate of U. S. computer output, due largely to this measurement difference, helps to explain why measured productivity in the United States has grown so much faster in the manufacturing than in the nonmanufacturing sector, whereas in other countries the sectoral growth rates are much closer together.
Cline observed that some policymakers have been dismissive of model-based predictions of the current account deficit. He applauded the paper for challenging that assertion. He agreed with the emphasis on slow growth as an explanation for the change in deficit, noting that the recent reduction in the trade deficit is a sign of weakness rather than strength. He also agreed that the dollar needs to decline about another 10 percent to reestablish equilibrium.
Gordon noted that since the exchange rate is back where it was in 1980, and income growth here and abroad have been roughly the same over the past decade, the $80 billion deterioration in the U.S. current account may be the result of other forces. He felt the paper needed a discussion of what these other forces were, and whether they were oneshot or trend phenomena. Robert Lawrence believed that the principal cause of the change in the current account has been a diffusion of U.S. technology to the rest of the world. He maintained that this effect should diminish over time.
